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In this study a civilian member of middle management
examines the internal and external forces that "bear on the
military officer during his management duty tours in the
supporting Shore Establishment, and influence his decision
making behavior. It is found through a literature search
that these motivational forces consist basically of:
(1) the increasing complexity of career patterns, (2) pro-
motion and attendant processes in an up or out situation,
and (3) the policy of job rotation. By means of statistical
analyses of data gathered by questionnaires, hypotheses are
tested which lead to the finding that the most desirable
military management billets perceived as springboards to
promotion have average tour lengths significantly shorter
than those of less desirable billets. It is concluded
that the above situation could be rectified, and other
problem areas resolved, through longer tour length assign-
ments. The study applies, in general, to any joint military-
civil service organization; however, primary interest is
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The reader may legitimately ask the question: "Why
should a civilian be concerned with Naval Officer career
development?" If the question were phrased within the
context of the Naval Operating Forces, the answer would
clearly be that the civilian should not be concerned. If,
however, the question were phrased within the context of
the supporting Naval Shore Establishment, the answer must
be that the civilian should be vitally concerned because
he is part of a civilian-military team. William N. Price,
writing in the Journal of Navy Civilian Manpower Management
Z~1973» PP« 20-21_7, explains the roles of each member of
this team as follows.
The Department (of the Navy) is primarily
a military organization. It may be said to
consist of two parts: (1) the Operating
Forces of ships, aircraft, and Marine combat
units - all sea-going, even when temporarily
based ashore, and (2) the supporting Shore
Establishment. The Operating Forces are one
hundred percent military manned, as they
should be; military discipline, military
procedures, military command and response
are essential for successful combat opera-
tions. In the Shore Establishment, top
management (below the civilian Secretariat,
of course) is military. Other positions in
the Shore Establishment are military for
purposes of sea-shore rotation, for training,
to insure combat readiness, to provide a
required military background, to enforce
military discipline, to comply with certain
laws, to man positions at remote locations
where civilians are not readily available,
and for some positions "peculiarly military,"

such as members of military bands, legation
guards, etc.
Continuity is an essential part of the
military-civilian mix that is supplied by
the civilian component. The typical Navy
civilian employee is not mobile. He tends
to stay in one geographical location, acquir-
ing more and more knowledge of the local
environment as well as of his particular job
or discipline. Navy military, on the other
hand, are very mobile, moving from one job
to another, often widely separated geograph-
ically, every one to four years. Civilians
therefore provide continuity and special
expertise, while the military provide broad
knowledge of the Navy and liaison between
the Shore Establishment and the Operating
Forces.
The two manpower systems have important
differences. The military personnel system
is highly centralized. Input is at the
lowest level (recruit, midshipman, officer
candidate) , rank is in the man and based
on his qualifications, and career progres-
sion is "up or out." The civilian system
is primarily decentralized. Input is at
any level, "rank" depends on duties assigned;
i.e., it is "position oriented" rather than
"person oriented." There is no requirement
to advance or to get out.
The military officer is seen then, from the stationary-
viewpoint of the civilian manager, as one who comes into
the top management jobs of the Shore Facility - stays for
a relatively short period of time - and then moves on.
What the military officer does during his brief tour is
of vital importance to both himself and the civilian man-
ager. For the military manager this period determines
whether he will move "up" to a higher rung in his career
ladder, or "out" to retirement. For the civilian manager
this period often results in dramatic changes to his job
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environment which may persist for substantial lengths of
time. Most of the changes that occur are, without question,
beneficial to all concerned. Some of the changes, however,
are not beneficial - at least from the civilian viewpoint.
The general purpose of this thesis is to examine some of
the reasons for these perceived non-beneficial changes and
to try to determine what might be done to eliminate them.
The examination will focus on the external and internal
forces that bear on the military officer during his manage-
ment tour in a supporting Shore Establishment; and the
impact these forces can have on the management decisions
he makes. The enlightenment gained should give the civil-
ian manager a better understanding of his military counter-
part. This better understanding should improve communi-
cations which in turn should enable both parties to take
action to preclude potential problem areas.
A. PERCEIVED PROBLEM AREAS
What, specifically, are some of the problem areas that
have been alluded to? To provide an answer to this question
the following three case studies are presented. In these
case studies it is not intended to show that the decisions
made by the military managers involved were good or bad;
rather it is intended to show only how the civilian managers
involved perceived these decisions, from their vantage
point, at the time they were made.
11

1. Case Study I
Approximately seven years ago the author joined a
new activity set up to design, develop and implement a
management information system to provide uniform standard
computer programs for Industrial and Fleet activities
within the Naval Air Systems Command. Efforts centered
on designing an Industrial Module, primarily for the (then)
seven Naval Air Rework Facilities; and a Fleet Module cover-
ing Naval Air Station activities other than the tenant
Naval Air Rework Facilities. An Executive Board con-
sisting of Captain and Flag rank officers was established
to review progress of the new management information system
design, and to provide guidance on the course of subsequent
effort. The management information system in planning was
large and comprehensive, with implementation scheduled over
approximately a ten-year time span. In November 1972,
however, the Executive Board decided to curtail further
development of the long-range plan except, essentially,
those portions of the plan which had already entered the
implementation phase. Hardest hit were the Fleet Module
effort which, at the time, was almost entirely still in
the design phase; and the Brand "X" computer procurement
plans. Brand "X" was to be a set of new computer equip-
ment required to operate the integrated management infor-
mation system when it reached the implementation phase.
It was proposed that the Brand "X" computers would be
installed - and replace existing computers - at the seven
12

Data Processing Departments located at the Naval Air Stations
that had Naval Air Rework Facilities as tenants.
The curtailment of the long-range management infor-
mation system was generally attributed to the high cost of
the planned program in relation to the declining budgets
associated with the last years of the Southeast Asia con-
flict. Several events occurred soon after, however, which
indicated that shortage of supporting funds might not have
been the primary factor. Of these, two major events were
that (1) the Naval Air Station Data Processing Departments,
after having been reorganized into Data Processing Service
Centers, were able to launch a program for a new computer
procurement to replace their aging hardware, and (2) a
Fleet-oriented management information system was initiated
to service aircraft carriers and Naval Air Stations. The
new computer procurement proved to be so similar to the
Brand "X" plans that it quickly became identified as Brand
"Y" to avoid confusion. The new Fleet-oriented management
information system proved to be almost conceptually iden-
tical to the previously abandoned Fleet Module design.
On reflection then, a search was made for other
than monetary factors that might have influenced the Ex-
ecutive Board's decision for curtailment. Two salient
factors which came to mind were: (1) the discontinuity
of the membership of the Executive Board, and (2) the
demonstrated impatience of the Board with the long-range
schedule of the plan.
13

Concerning the Board membership, it was noted that
the original Board that met in October 1970 consisted of
eight members. One year later the Board consisted of 11
members, with seven of the original eight in attendance.
Two years later the Board had expanded to 14 members ; of
the original eight, four were in attendance. (Two of these
four, however, were now attached to different Commands.)
By June 1973 "the Board stood at 12 members; only one of the
three original remaining members was still with the same
command.
Concerning the noted impatience with the long-range
plan schedule, it had been observed that the Captain members
of the Board had exhibited extreme interest in portions of
the overall plan that would be implemented at their particular
Command during their tour in office, and relatively little
interest in portions of the program scheduled for imple-
mentation after their term. Flag officers present, however,
were noted to take a significantly broader interest time-wise.
In summary then, it was perceived from the civilian
standpoint that the Board decision for program curtailment
may have been influenced by Board member discontinuity caused
by the military billet job rotation system; and by rejection
of long-range plans viewed as unacceptable to military man-
agers who, because of the job rotation system, must be pri-
marily concerned with achievement of short-range objectives.
14

2. Case Study II
In 1971 the author was assigned to assist one of
the Naval Air Rework Facilities in development and imple-
mentation of a computer program to be used as a tool for
improved selection and scheduling of aircraft for rework.
The Aeronautical Engineering Department of the Naval Air
Rework Facility involved had developed a computer program
which made use of multiple regression statistical techniques
to determine significant variables which could be used to
determine the material condition of individual aircraft
operational in the Fleet. Thus, by collecting a small
amount of information, the Naval Air Rework Facility could
predict ahead of time what the material condition of indi-
vidual aircraft selected for rework induction would be
when they arrived. This information, in turn, could then
be converted into man-hours of labor, dollar value of
labor, and dollar value of material that would be required
to rework each aircraft. This information, in turn, could
be used to set up a quarterly induction schedule that would
be uniform and therefore more efficient than the existing
system which treated each aircraft as if it would require
the same amount of rework as any other aircraft. This
latter system frequently resulted in "peak and valley"
production schedules with their attendant inefficiencies.
After the new system had been tested and found to be ex-
tremely accurate in its predictions and cost effective in
its use, it was presented to the appropriate military man-
ager in Washington, D. C. , and accepted for immediate
15

implementation at all Naval Air Rework Facilities. Work
began on the instructions which would officially implement
the program, and training classes were set up and scheduled.
At this point, however, the military manager who had accepted
the program rotated on to a new billet and another military
manager took his place. Shortly thereafter the new man
announced that he was not willing to support the new pro-
gram, and without this support it quickly died. The pro-
gram had its share of opponents as well as supporters and
it may well have been a good decision to kill it. It should
be noted, however, that the military manager who originally
accepted the new system later went on to Flag rank, while
his replacement did not.
In summary, it was perceived by this civilian, for
one , that the program may have lacked support from the
incoming officer because he really had no interest in
pushing a program started by his predecessor, and for which
he could gain no personal credit during his tour in office.
It was also perceived that, had the original officer remained
in the billet for another year, the program would have been
allowed to continue.
3. Case Study III
One aspect of the management information system
arena noticed over the last seven years by the author has
«
been resistance by almost all military managers to the
restrictions imposed by the nature of standard uniform
automatic data processing programs. The main objections
16

are that standard uniform programs take too long to develop
and implement, are not flexible to changing demands, and
take too long to modify. To circumvent this process the
military manager often takes the shorter, quicker path
to achieving his immediate objectives by developing his
own local unique computer programs. While it cannot be
denied that this action is necessary in many situations,
it also cannot be denied that it often results in undesir-
able aftereffects. A General Auditing Office report
Z~1975» PP. 9. 16 and 18_7 recently criticized the Navy
shipyards for developing and using local computer programs
to supplement or replace standard programs. From I966
to 1971 "the seven shipyards developed and used an estimated
1,500 local programs compared with about 280 standard
programs. An investigation indicated that standardization
efforts could reduce the number of local programs to 928
while raising the standard programs to about 300. The
report further states:
The Department (of the Navy) has not
been successful in developing standard
information and data processing systems
primarily because its management philosophy
allows commanders to unduly influence the
design of standard systems to modify stand-
ard systems or to develop systems for local
needs without regard to the Department's
program objectives and management needs.
System designers adhere more to the
desires of individual commanders than
to the Department's basic policies,
principles, and procedures.
The author has observed several instances where
individual commanders have, through great personal effort,
17

developed and implemented local unique management infor-
mation systems. It has been noted, however, that these
systems later tend to struggle due to diminished support
after departure of the founding officer from the command.
In the case of computer programs this can be very damaging
in that these systems usually require a great deal of
support after implementation if they are to remain viable
.
The civilian perception of the above, then, is
that military managers appear to have a strong motivation
to accomplish visible tasks, preferably through their own
creative action, during their term in office. It is also
perceived that they may not be too concerned with possible
troublesome aftereffects of their actions in that chances
are they will have moved on to new billets before these
problems become significant.
B . HYPOTHESES
From the above case studies, then, the military manager
is seen as one who is placed in successively more responsi-
ble positions every few years where he must repeatedly
exhibit high personal performance levels, or be forced to
retire from the system. As he rises up the promotional
ladder the number of available billets decreases; therefore,
he must face increasingly stiffer competition as he pro-
gresses. Since he will be incumbent in his billet for
only a short time he is motivated to take those actions
which will produce positive accomplishments during his
18

term. He is more interested in creating or innovating an
action than he is in following through on action innovated
by a competitor. The aggregate of the above motivating
forces results in the development of a strongly tactical
view toward each assignment rather than a strategical view.
This mechanism, if it exists, gives rise to a paradox. The
military manager will have attained the highest positions
of responsibility - those of a strategic nature - through
the development and exercise of tactical skills.
Consideration of all of the above has led to the follow-
ing train of thought: Strategic plans are affected most
by certain key billets which carry the most management
responsibility. Because of the visibility such a billet
sheds on the performance of the incumbent officer, his
chances for promotion should be greatly affected. The
competitive demand for these key billets should therefore
be very strong and possibly could result in a tendency for
these jobs (up to but not including Flag rank billets) to
have a significantly more rapid than normal turnover. If
true, then the very jobs that affect long-range plans most
would be the same jobs that have the shortest- term managers.
This shortened time-span in office would serve to increase
the pressure on the incumbent to "accomplish something"
during his term which in turn would almost guarantee that
long-range strategic plans would be sacrificed to accom-
modate short-range tactical goals. Based on this thought,
it was decided to formulate the following two hypotheses
19

as the focal points on which to base an investigation which
would serve as the specific goal of this thesis:
1. Hypothesis One
HI: Within available choices, certain Naval Shore
Establishment billets are perceived by the military manager
as being more desirable than others for promotion purposes.
2. Hypothesis Two
The testing of this hypothesis was to be contingent
on whether or not the first hypothesis was found to be true.
H2: The most desirable military management billets
perceived as springboards to promotion have average tour
lengths significantly shorter than those of less desirable
billets.
C . OBJECTIVES
This thesis addresses both a general and a specific
objective. Within the general objective the thesis attempts
to examine the internal and external forces that bear on
the military officer during his management tour in a sup-
porting Shore Establishment, and influence the decisions
he makes.
Within the specific objective the thesis attempts to
determine whether or not the two hypotheses described just
above are true.
From the findings of both objectives the thesis attempts
to draw conclusions with a view toward recommending actions
that might alleviate some perceived problems and bring
20

better understanding between members of the military-
civilian management team.
D. SCOPE
Conduct of the general objective was by literature
search covering the broad scope of all military services.
The scope of the specific objective was narrowed to
that comprising Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officers
within the Naval Air Systems Command. Conduct of the
specific objective was through statistical analysis of
questionnaires.
The following pages will present first the findings
of the literature search conducted for the general objec-
tive. Next will be presented the methodology and results
of the statistical tests of the hypotheses conducted to
achieve the specific objective. And finally, conclusions





The literature search made to examine the internal and
external forces that bear on the military officer during
his management tour in a supporting Shore Establishment,
and influence his decision making, turned up material
that centered on three themes: (1) the increasing com-
plexity of career patterns, (2) promotion and its attendant
processes in an up or out situation, and (3) the policy
of job rotation. A review of findings in each of these
three areas follows.
A. CAREER PATTERN COMPLEXITY
1 . The Unrestricted Line Officer
Shepherd's thesis "Career Planning Information in
Officer Professional Development" /~197^, pp. 26-31_J7 pro-
vided the following information.
Career patterns continue to be a perplexing
issue for the Bureau of Naval Personnel. As
previously stated, formal patterns in the early
Navy were of little consequence. The ladders
of success were well worn. The missions and
equipment were simple in comparison to today.
Officers knew what was expected of them and
knew when they should be in various positions
within the Naval Organization. Contrast
this simple career plan with officers enter-
ing the Navy today. They are faced with an
immediate choice of which one of the seven
major categories to enter, then selection of
a specialty within that designator, and,
finally, for the specialists in one of the
four warfare areas, which of the twenty-




The Officer Personnel Newsletter offers
this guidance: Career patterns are as varied
as the backgrounds of the officers who repre-
sent the Navy and no one set of circumstances
or assignments could ever be endorsed as "the
only way to success." There exist, however,
several basic requirements which of necessity
are common to all successful unrestricted
line careers. With this view in mind, the
following comments are offered: Normally a
newly commissioned officer is initially
assigned to a billet at sea, and since his
performance in this environment is the most
important single criterion, his efforts should
be devoted to performing those duties assigned
in the most effective and preserving manner
possible. Concurrently he should be preparing
himself for billets of increased responsi-
bility via correspondence courses, fleet
schools, and on-the-job training. The junior
officer's primary objective, quite naturally,
is to prepare himself for a future assignment
as a department head where he can apply that
knowledge and experience gained during earlier
assignments. Also, the junior officer should
be planning during these formative years for
later assignments to executive officer and
commanding officer billets.
To reach the position of Commanding Officer
of a surface vessel in the grade of Commander,
a typical officer will have been examined by
a minimum of nine boards, including statutory
boards for rank and administrative boards for
command, postgraduate school, etc., in addition
to having passed a rigorous written and prac-
tical examination for command. At each screen-
ing point those officers not having passed the
usual number of milestones are in a weaker
position than their contemporaries, their
performance notwithstanding.
Aviation officers are counciled with speci-
fic guidance for in-grade billets such as:
Three basic tours are desirable in the grade
of commander: A CO tour resulting from board
action, an afloat staff or ship tour where
a Flag Watch Officer or CDO qualification
can be attained and a Washington tour if
qualified and the individual has had no pre-
vious duty in Washington.
23

2. The Restricted Duty Line Officer
Shepherd continues: Guidance to officers
of the restricted line and staff corps is more
detailed. Career patterns in these communities
are well known and each officer is generally
provided with a long-range planning document
and directory of officers within his desig-
nator. This directory lists the incumbent
in the billet and his expected rotation date.
Officers are actively encouraged to use this
information when planning and requesting future
assignments.
Shepherd goes on to describe the career patterns
of the Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officers who formed
the sample population of the statistical analysis which
is described later in this thesis.
The relatively small size of the AEDO
community permits a high degree of "per-
sonalized attention" to career planning
that would be impossible to achieve in
larger, less manageable groups. The ca-
reer pattern of each 151X officer is
continually under review to ensure that
he is progressively accumulating the
background and experience necessary for
effective performance in future senior
assignments.
Each 151X officer should progress
through a series of job assignments in such
fashion that he naturally becomes aligned
with a major AED command area. These command
areas coincide roughly with the four major
activity categories described earlier;
namely, (1) Operational Support, (2) Naval
Air Systems Command Headquarters, (3) Re-
search, Development, Test and Evaluation,
(^) Production/Rework.
If assigned from headquarters to a re-
work activity, then the next assignment
should be in operational support.
Starting from an operational support
assignment, the next assignment should be
to headquarters, or to either RDT&E or
Production/Rework followed by headquarters.
2k

If an officer starts early in his career,
an opportunity exists for assignments in each
of the four areas.
Any of the four areas can serve as the
starting point but the mandatory headquarters
requirement might dictate the direction and
the option.
Shepherd also makes the summary statement that with
today's forms of specialization, including both operational,
and managerial and technical, formal career patterns are a
necessity. Within each specialty there will remain some
flexibility. However, the intense and repetitive selec-
tion process will, much as with salmon spawning upstream,
select out not only the poor performers but those who stray
too far from the main stream.
3. The Military Manager Role
In addition to the above career planning complexities,
the officer also faces problems associated with his increas-
ingly important role as manager in the Shore Establishment.
Paulsen, in his thesis "Military Managers in the joint Mil-
itary-Civil Service Organization" /~1965i PP- 2-3_7 writes:
In the early years of our Navy, the Naval
Officer was strictly a sea-going man and shore
duties were handled by civilians. The many
changes in the size, type and complexities
of our ships , as well as the increasing
importance of the supporting and technol-
ogical aspects of warfare, have resulted
in a tremendous expansion of both the
shore and fleet organizations of the Navy.
As the naval establishment becomes pro-
gressively dependent on complex technology,
the importance of the military manager in-
creases. The new tasks of the military
require that the professional officer
develop more and more of the skills and
orientations common to civilian adminis-
trators and civilian leaders ... the military
25

commander must become more interested and
more skilled in techniques of organization,
in the management of morale and negotiation.
The problems of the military manager in
the joint military-civilian service organi-
zation are complicated by one factor not
common elsewhere; he must manage his single
workforce in a common mission under at
least two different personnel and career
systems. His civil service personnel must
be managed under the Federal civil service
system and his officers and enlisted men
must be managed under a military system.
Individual and group goals, motives, values
and incentives tend to be different in each
system.
k. Stress Factors
It is apparent from the above that the Naval Officer
must grapple with a myriad of problems on a broad front during
his career, and that the demands placed upon him can create
a great deal of stress. Karge explored this area in his
thesis "A Study of Executive Tension as it Relates to the
Efficiency of the Naval Officer Corps." In the thesis,
/~1971, pp. D-l and D-2_7, Professor William H. Church,
staff advisor, added some comments on the effects that
stress on the military manager can cause. His comments are
repeated below:
Additional points of stress in the inter-
personal relationships of those in the armed
services include:
1. Relationships between civilian and
military personnel.
2. Officer-enlisted relationships.
3. Continuous readjustment to new
working environment and personnel.
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k. Continuous pressure for "outstanding
performance and conduct" with the up or out
philosophy.
5« Fear of ruining career with one
mistake.
It is pointed out in this study that some
stress and even some fear of failure can con-
stitute constructive stimuli to achievement.
Some stress can be termed "normal." We define
morale today as the inner urge on the part of
the individual to do what the organization
expects of him. People who have this trait
can generally be classed as working under
some stress to "live up to expectations."
The big area of difficulty is the unnecessary-
stress caused by administrators or col-
leagues - either military or civilian - that
fail to live up to some of what might be
termed the responsibilities of a position
of leadership and trust. These people either
fail to learn enough about the areas in
which they may be given authority and
responsibility before "indulging" in
decision making or they fail to recog-
nize that a manager cannot be expected
in today's complex world to know every-
thing and should therefore call on qualified
personnel within the organization for
proper advice and counsel before reaching
conclusions ... or decisions. Another
"stress maker" is the vascillating individ-
ual who cannot make up his mind even with
facts available and who unduly delays
decision making essential to the routine
of conducting business. The chain of
command violator who feels no compunction
about going over the heads of responsible
subordinates for advice but wants everyone
to strictly follow the chain of command
to him is a much top familiar type of stress
creator.
The officer who feels under stress to
make a good showing to get a good fitness
report sometimes has done irreparable harm
to the organization and the people who serve
around him. At sea he is an autocrat who
doesn't trust anyone and who sets his own
standards but frequently neglects to tell
his subordinates just what these standards
are . Two or three tours with officers of
27

this type does much to cause both officer
and enlisted personnel to leave the service.
Ashore these same officers will try to learn
what higher authority wants of them and what
they can do to "look good" in the eyes of
the command and then run rough shod over
personnel within the organization to attain
objectives in which they have placed their
own ego and personal aggrandizement above
the needs of the organization as a whole.
Unfortunately, these management "failures"
are frequently promoted in this system.
Further, some of them have so little sen-
sitivity to a proper "human relations"
approach that they are oblivious of the
damage they cause. The civilian who builds
an empire and who continuously places his
own ambition ahead of the needs of the
organization and who also rides rough shod
over the men and women who oppose him is
just as damaging to morale or the inner
urge of those who if treated better would
have faithfully exerted themselves to do
what the organization expected and who with
a little encouragement and understanding
could and would strive for higher levels
of attainment and production.
B. PROMOTION AND ATTENDANT PROCESSES
Concerning this area the literature search indicated
that the interest lay in two main categories: (1) acqui-
sition of desired duty assignments, and (2) adequate pre-
paration for good performance within those assignments.
Some mention was also made of the focus on short-term goals
The following discussion covers each of these three factors
in turn.
1. Acquisition of Desired Duty Assignments
Shepherd (pp. 16, 27, 33, 3^, and 56) wrote that:
Promotion and its attendant policies are
always uppermost in any Naval officer's
planning. Unlike his contemporaries in
business or industry, where promotions are
not an up or out situation, an officer
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"failed of selection" is with very few ex-
ceptions approaching termination of his naval
career. By law an officer's career will be
involuntarily terminated only after he has
twice failed selection, and then the timing
of his release is determined by his rank.
Regardless of the circumstances no more
disastrous event can befall a member of
this highly competitive group.
Career patterns are a critical problem
largely because they form the common denomi-
nator for selection boards. Officers are
promoted by boards who judge their performance
of duty in relation to their contemporaries.
In order to make this judgment equitable when
dealing with thousands of officers, minimum
standards of qualifications are established.
Each subgroup of officers establishes within
its field of expertise certain gates through
which officers must pass in order to be con-
sidered qualified for higher responsibility
within that field.
Shepherd goes on to make the point that, while a
carefully planned career pattern and good job performance
are vitally important for advancement, duty assignments
also have a strong influence on promotion processes.
The old Navy adages like "the good jobs
seek the good men" and "superior performance
in any billet will lead to success," should
be considered inoperative. Anything less
than factual information is insufficient
and may be misleading advice to junior of-
ficers required to make decisions in the
first five years of their careers that will
ultimately govern the majority of their
assignments in the following twenty-six.
The Navy has gone on record to indicate that
there are in fact assignments considered
to be injurious to an officer's development.
On this point Shepherd quotes from the Bureau of
Naval Personnel (Officer Distribution Division), The Of-
ficer Personnel Newsletter, June 1968, page k.
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Occasionally an officer is well qualified
for many jobs, and although a particular assign-
ment at this point in his career has much more
to offer in the way of professional development,
the realities of "service needs" may dictate
another assignment. If there is the likelihood
that such an assignment will have an adverse
effect on an officer's professional development,
the Chief of Naval Personnel has the authority
to note in his official record the reasons for
such an assignment, making it clear that per-
formance or lack of qualifications was not
the determining factor. The determination
as to the appropriateness of such an action
is the prerogative of the Chief of Naval
Personnel and will be exercised without
requests from individual officers.
Shepherd administered a questionnaire to 1190 Naval
Postgraduate School students, and officers at the Naval
Recruiting Office in San Francisco, to determine their
opinions concerning career patterns, selection boards
and assignment policies. His summary of the 65^ responses
was
:
There are indications that the general
population of officers is aware of specific
requirements within their fields . . . con-
cerning specific billets officers felt they
should have, 79. 3$ felt some billets were
linked to consistent promotion and 7^-7%
classed individual billets as central to
their career planning. In particular,
91.3$ of the oldest and most traditional
group, the surface warfare officers, were
concentrating their career planning on
specific assignments.
For additional information pertinent to duty assign-
ment opinion, five of Shepherd's questions (with consensus
replies) are excerpted below:
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Question (17): Are there specific billets
in your designator community which you believe
have consistently high promotion probabilities?
Answer (17): Yes - 79.2$
No -8.1$
Don't Know - 12.7$
Question (21): Are there any specific
billets that are central to your personal
career planning?
Answer (21): Yes - 7*k6$
No - 25- fyo
Question (2^): Do you feel superior
performance in a second team billet is equal
to or greater than mediocre performance in
a first team billet, for promotional oppor-
tunities?
Answer (2^): Yes - 58.0$
No 25. 75^
Don't Know - 16.3$
Question (28): Do you believe selection
boards are more impressed with:
Answer (28): Billets held - 19.9$
Performance - 62.2$
Don't know - 17-9$
Question (32): Given the choice my next
billet would be:
Answer (32): Job which offers good 28.1$
promotion reputation
Type of work I would 59.8$
particularly enjoy
At location I would 12.1$
particularly enjoy
The answers to the above five questions appear to
indicate a certain degree of ambivalence concerning duty
assignments. On one hand there is the recognition that
certain billets have high promotion probabilities, while,
on the other hand, there is a reluctance to accept these
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"billets if they do not fall in the type of work they
enjoy. This may be due to the fear that such an assignment
may lead to mediocre performance in a first team billet
(one outside the field of expertise in which they feel
comfortable)
,
whereas it is preferable to stay within their
comfortable field where there is a better chance for superior
performance, even if the billet is of the second team variety.
Allen and Loftus in their thesis "Career Development of
the Navy Project Manager" /~1973, p. 8l_7 make an inter-
esting comment on this point:
BUPERS policy as promulgated by the
individual detailers has always been that
performance is to be the standard of measure-
ment for promotion. But for the individual
who is planning his own career development,
the importance of the billet will play a
deciding role. No officer with a good per-
formance record will wish to select an
assignment which has a reputation among
his peers as "second team." According to
RADM Rice's study, the "second team" nature
of these billets will continue to be a
problem until Navy top-level management
takes positive steps to provide a climate
for growth.
As the capstone to this section, CDR Charles
Gibfried of the Naval Postgraduate School staff has con-
tributed some heretofore unpublished material prepared
for a term paper entitled "The Kiss of Death -- or --
Pre- selection by Duty Assignment." Some excerpts follow:
It is the contention of this paper that
the officer's duty station at the time of
consideration for selection, in the case of
the Supply Corps, is indicative of his oppor-
tunity for promotion. This apparently naive
hypothesis means that the NAVSUP Office of
Personnel (OP) has preselected or condemned
the officer receiving orders to such a command.
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This conclusion, if true, is quite disturbing
to a naval officer. It appears to be counter
to all professional career guidance, naval
folklore and inside advice given to junior
officers over the years, such as:
"It's performance that counts, son."
"Be sure to get all your tickets punched."
"There are no bad jobs; just bad performance."
"You have to have a tour in Washington."
However, when reconsidered these statements
are not really false. Ticket-punching--or
getting all the "right" duty stations and a
variety of independent department head jobs
can only happen with OP's cooperation. You
will never have a chance to have your ticket
punched or to qualify yourself for the next
higher rank unless OP details you to that type
of billet. It is performance that counts
also. If one had not performed in the past,
he could not expect that "career- enhancing"
job now. And when you, as a senior commander,
are condemned to a dead-end job, you must
remember that it is your past performance
that got you there.
Gibfried illustrated his point by making use of
material obtained from the Register of Commissioned and
Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Reserve
Officers on Active Duty (NAVPERS Publication 15018) of
31 December 1970 and 1971. This publication identified
all the officers eligible for selection to the ranks of
Captain and Commander. These names were matched against
the currently assigned duty stations as listed in the
Supply Corps Officers Directory (NAVSUP Publication 365)
of November 1970 and 1971. He then constructed a diagram
of the over-all naval command structure where senior Supply
Corps Commanders were stationed during the selection year.
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Commands were identified as RED-HOT if they had a 100$
selection rate; GOLDEN if the selection percentage was
in excess of 70$; NEUTRAL-WHITE if the selection per-
centage varied between 20$ to 67$; and EDGED-IN-BLACK if
their selection percentage was zero. He indicated that
the performance percentages were chosen in relation to the
60$ selection percentage during fiscal years 1971 and 1972
Gibfried continued:
Studying the command performances, one
cannot help but be surprised by the pre-
dominance of RED-HOT and EDGED- IN- BLACK com-
mands. Most observers would expect the
majority of commands to be either GOLDEN
or NEUTRAL-WHITE, knowing rather intuitively
that while some duty stations are better
than others, opportunities for success exist
everywhere. But apparently this is not
the case.
To fully appreciate the statistics which
support this paper an old inventory control
technique was applied to obtain a "distri-
bution by value (in this case, selection)"
on the eligible commanders; this is depicted
in figure (2) /"see Table I of this thesis_7.
Over the past two years ^6.8$ of the captains
were chosen from the RED-HOT or "no-miss"
commands; in other words, 20$ of the eligibles
wrapped-up almost 50$ of the promotions. At
the other end of the scale one-third of
the commanders were at EDGED-IN-BLACK or
"not-one" commands and were virtually never
considered for promotion. The enormous pro-
portion of officers at "not-one" commands is
apparent. When combined with the .NEUTRAL-
WHITE 20$ to 67$ commands, one can see that
two-thirds of the officers considered received
only 28.6$ of the promotions and the remaining
36.5$ of the officers from the RED-HOT and
GOLDEN commands garnered the remaining 71.^$
of the four-striper spots.
Selection to commander closely parallels
the captain selection results. The distri-
bution by selection represented in figure (6)




SELECTION TO CAPTAIN DISTRIBUTION
COMMAND ELIGIBLE
NO . TOTAL fo
SELECTED GROUP
NO. TOTAL % %
1. NAVSUP 6 6
2. Schools 5 11
3. NAVSUPACT'S 4 15
4. AFS-Ship 4 19
5. FMSO 3 22
6. AEC/Weapons 3 25
7. NRSO 2 27
8. OPNAV 2 29
9. NSC-Oakland 2 31
10. SECDEF 1 32
11. SECNAY 1 3
12. SERVPAC/LANT 1 3
13. POLARIS 1 35
1^. Maritime 1 36
15. ICP's 8 44
16. DSC f s 11 55
17. NSC's 7 62
18. Ax-Ship 3 65
19. CVx-Ship 5 70
20. NAVCOMPT 2 72
21. NFC/NRFC 2 74
22. NSD's 2 76
23. AIRPAC/LANT 2 78
24. DSD's 2 80
25. Joint Staff 5 85
26. NAS-Major 5 90
27. NAS-Minor 5 95
28. SHIPYARD'S 9 104
29. DCASR's 3 107
30. NRPO 3 HO
31. NSC-Norfolk 5 115
32. ORDSTA's 7 122
33. NAVDistrict's 5 127
34. DEVCenter's 5 132
35. NAVBase's 5 137
36. TRACOM's 4 141
37. JCS 2 143
38. CNM 2 145
39. SYSCOM's 2 14 7
40. MSTS/MOT 2 149
41. SUPSHIPS 2 151
42. FAW's 2 153
43. MAG's 2 155
44. NX's 2 157







































































































































































































SELECTION TO COMMANDER DISTRIBUTION
COMMAND ELIGIBLE SELECTED GROUP
NO,. TOTAL $ NO. TOTAL <fo %
1. NSC's 9 9 3.0 9 9 100.0 *.7
2. NAVSUP 8 17 5-7 8 17 100.0 8.8
3- OPNAV 6 23 7.6 6 23 100.0 13.5
4. NAS-Major 5 28 9.3
I
28 100.0 14.5
5- CNM 4 32 10.6 32 100.0 16.6
6. MAG-VietNam 4 36 12.0 4 36 100.0 18. 7
7. Joint Staff 3 39 13.0 3 39 100.0 20.2
8. NSC-Oakland 3 42 14.0 3 42 100.0 21.8
9. NAVCOMPT 2 44 14.6 2 44 100.0 22.8
10. NFC/NRFC 2 46 15.3 2 46 100.0 23.8
11. NSD's 2 48 16.0 2 48 100.0 24.9
12. NSO 3 51. 17.0 3 51 100.0 26.4
13. NPO/NRPO 2 53 17.6 2 53 100.0 27.5
14. AEC/Weapons 2 55 18.
3
2 55 100.0 28.5
15- Misc. (9) 9 64 21.3 9 64 100.0 33.2
16. Ax--ship 7 71 23.6 7 71 100.0 37.3
17. CVx-ship 3 7^ 24.6 3 7^ 100.0 38.9
18. LPH— ship 3 77 25.6 3 77 100.0 39.8
19. POLARIS 2 79- 26.3 2 79 100.0 40.9
20. SERVRON 2 81 27.0 2 81 100.0 42.0
21. Schools 19 100 33-3 18 99 94.8 51.3
22. ICP's 14 114 38.0 13 112 92.7 58.0
23. SYSCOM's 12 126 42.0 11 123 91.7 63.7
24. FMSO 6 132 44.0 5 128 83.7 66.3
25- DSC's 11 143 47.6 9 137 81.
9
71.0
26. NX's 10 153 51.0 8 145 80.0 75.1
27. DSA 4 157 52.3 3 148 75.0 76.7
28. DSD's 4 161 53.6 3 151 75.0 78.2
29. TYCOM'
s
14 175 58.3 10 161 72.6 83.^
30. Army 3 178 59.3 2 163 66.7 84.5
31. NRSO 3 181 60.3 2 165 66.7 85-5
32. Cx— ship 3 184 61.3 2 167 66.7 86.5
33- NSC-Norfolk 5 189 63.O 3 170 60.0 88.1
34. Navy Staff 2 191 63.6 1 171 50.0 88.6
35. Commissary 6 197 65^6 3 17^ 50.0 90.2
36. NAAS 2 199 66.3 1 175 50.0 90.7
37. SUPSHIPs 5 204 68.0 2 177 40.0 91.7
38. NAVBase's 8 212 70.6 3 180 37.5 93.3
39. DCASO's 9 221 73-6 3 183 33.3 94.8
40. MAG 3 224 74.6 1 184 33.3 95.3
41. NAS-Minor 23 247 82.3 7 191 29.2 99.0
42. SHIPYARD'S 4 251 83.6 1 192 25.0 99.5




SELECTION TO COMMANDER DISTRIBUTION
COMMAND ELIGIBLE SELECTED GROUP
NO. TOTAL $ NO. TOTAL fo %
«*. ORDSTA's 8 267 89.O 193 0.0
45- Air Force 4 271 90.3 193 0.0
46. Instructor 4 275 91.6 193 0.0
47. TRACOM's 2 277 92.3 193 0.0
48. FAW 2 279 93.0 193 0.0
49. MCAS 2 281 93-6 193 0.0
50. NARF 2 283 94.3 193 0.0
51. CB's 2 285 95.0 193 0.0
52. Misc (14) 14 299 100.0 193 0.0
that 42$ of the commanders were selected
from RED-HOT "no-miss" commands and about
one-half of the eligibles collected 75$ of
the promotions. The remaining half scrambled
for 25% of the three-striper spots. Thirteen
percent of the total were effectively eli-
minated as originating from "not-one" commands.
After cautioning that, although the pattern seemed
clear, certain limiting assumptions had admittedly affected
the results, Gibfried makes the following summary statement
Perhaps it would be well to consider
briefly the logic behind the assignment-
selection process. The statistics con-
sidered thus far are a direct function of
OP's role in the officer's career develop-
ment process. It is OP that must distinguish
the hard chargers and the marginal performers
from the bulk of officers forming the middle
of the curve. Responsible billets are found
for the hard chargers; jobs which qualify
them to have their ticket punched to prove
that they have continued to excell in a




For the officer, the message is clear:
performance at your current duty station is
paramount. The past no longer counts. Past
performance merely enabled you to "be placed
in a position to perform well once more in a
new environment. An officer soon develops a
reputation with those in OP who review his
fitness reports and with other commands and
commanding officers who hear of his exemplary
accomplishments. The performance record and
reputation enable one to obtain career enhanc-
ing billets where high performance is expected
and will be rewarded. In that manner each
officer is capable of building a career en-
hancing track record and reputation which
will place him in commands where success is
the rule
.
2. Preparation for Performance in Assignment.
In this area the literature indicates that the
military manager senses that he may be caught on the horns
of a dilemma. As he progresses up the promotion ladder
he finds that he needs more and more management-oriented
education (of which he generally has little), and less and
less of his engineering or scientific-oriented education
(of which he generally has a substantial amount) . Thus,
in the management billets, he may feel that he lacks ade-
quate preparation to allow him to realize his best potential
performance in the job.
Professor William H. Church, writing in Karge's
thesis /~1971, p. D-3_7 indicated some of the stresses and
tension this situation can cause:
Top scientists at R&D activities have
reported some special types of tensions
encountered when some of the officers as-
signed as project directors "come aboard"
the R&D activity with advanced technical
degrees but no previous opportunity either
to keep up with the field or to practice
or operate in the technical research field.
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In the words of one scientist: "When one of
these officers has the misfortune to guess
right on his first effort, he feels a com-
pulsion to continue to attempt to make de-
cisions in areas where he is competing with
much more seasoned talent with a much higher
probability of being correct. I wish you
people would not teach them so much."
Having talked to many of the officers in
charge of projects, a common reaction is that
knowledge of how to persuade and lead people
and knowledge of various effective methods of
coordinating, organizing and controlling
projects would have been more valuable than
the intense exposure to quite so much
technical material. As a minimum they
indicated a need for management education
on top of the technical background. The
stresses felt by the scientists at the
R&D activity are, of course, the same ten-
sions professional civilian educators feel
in military undergraduate and graduate
educational programs if decision making
goes on without a participative process
that takes into full account variances in
the approach to specific disciplines and
curricula.
J. Ronald Fox, in his classic work "Arming America"
/~197^, pp. 191, 19^, and 199_7 cites an example of the
kind of position no military manager wants to finds himself
in:
Dependence on rotation as an educational
tool in itself does not take into account that
even the most capable officers need appropriate
training for management as well as operational
assignments. Both the officer and the program
to which he is assigned suffer when such
training is lacking.
We visited one program office in which
the chief of the financial management divi-
sion was a qualified pilot. He admitted
having no interest in procurement or fin-
ancial management and could not understand
why he had been assigned to the office.
During the week in which we visited his
division, we often found him chatting with
fellow officers about his flying experiences.
39

At other times he sat at his desk gazing out
the window. His assistant was a major who
had "been assigned to the program office several
months earlier. The major spent long hours
in the program office, reviewing financial
information and preparing reports for the
program manager and headquarters. Toward the
end of the week, during an informal conver-
sation, he asked if we could contact someone
in Washington about his assignment. His
background and training - including a Master's
degree - were in the field of bioastronautics.
Like his supervisor, he had neither training
nor experience in business administration,
financial management, or procurement.
For the past two decades many in the
Defense Department have not recognized that
business management skills are distinct from
engineering and scientific skills. A general
in one of the larger buying commands com-
mented: One of the causes of our current
problems arises from the fact that we failed
to recognize that a program manager must
be a business manager and need not be an
expert scientist or an expert engineer.
Sushka, in his thesis "A Comparative Study of the
Navy Project Manager and his Civilian Counterpart in Indus-
try" /"1976, pp. 62-6^_7, wrote:
All personnel interviewed agreed that the
project manager must be a generalist whether
he be military or civilian. He should not be
expected to be an expert in all the technical
fields involved in the weapons systems but
must have sufficient knowledge of each^ tech-
nical discipline to make trade-off decisions
rationally. Beyond that he needs knowledge
in the financial and business fields. All
managers remarked that educationally he must
have an equal background in engineering and
business management.
Essentially, the degree to which the fac-
tors of higher education, operational expe-
rience and technical expertise exist in the
project manager's background tend to influence
his methods and manner of performance and
ultimately project effectiveness. Taken
separately, the education should be of
suitable breadth to provide creditability,
stature and self-assurance and should include
^0

matters of contract law, business law and
administration, financial management and
engineering.
...the military line project manager
usually comes to his project management job
through a career progression that has con-
tinually put the opportunity to gain on the
job acquisition experience and training
required for project managers in jeopardy
because of the forces created in pursuing
the classic career carrot at the end of the
stick: major combatant command. Instead
of coming to his job with procurement
experience, management education and weapons
acquisition expertise to combat all the
adversaries, the military manager arrives
more as the operational warrior of the
past and less the proficient project man-
ager. He thus tends to be more conservative
and less of a risk taker. He often shows
less initiative and is less innovative than
his civilian counterpart, as the background
for taking risks and demonstrating something
other than conformity often is lacking and
is less adequate than that of the civilian
manager in industry. That background and
experience which is required to get the
project management job done effectively
and that which is the expected norm of a
typical line captain's behavior as he pro-
ceeds through the prescribed stepping stones
to Flag rank are often in conflict - often
to the detriment of the overall project.
Allen and Loftus /~1973. PP- 38 and klj/ offered
material that indicated there was some disagreement with
the idea of increased management training. For instance,
in I969 - 1970 the Navy Weapon System Acquisition Manage-
ment Study group determined that the curriculum at the
Naval Postgraduate School should strengthen its Material
Management electives and orient them to provide more
emphasis on Weapons Systems Acquisition. In addition
it was reported that the Superintendent of the Post-
graduate School was developing a specific educational

program in support of project management consisting of
formal education in engineering, science, or mathematics
followed by graduate education in the field of management,
"business administration, or industrial engineering. It
was considered likely that such a curriculum would attract
many competent officers who were not necessarily motivated
for engineering or science programs. After review, com-
ments by high ranking officers on this recommendation
were
:
The emphasis on managerial, as opposed
to technical education, aroused some concern.
Some felt that the program being developed
at the Postgraduate School might prove so
attractive as to lure officers away from
technical curricula, to the detriment of
providing adequate technical talent in
general, and the restricted line in par-
ticular. While some felt that the emphasis
should be on managerial education, as
management problems seemed to be the most
serious ones and the ones most frequently
criticized in Navy programs, still others
considered that a balance of both managerial
and technical expertise was required. Another
popular concept was that skills required of
the project manager change as the project
itself evolves through the design, develop-
ment, test, and production phases with
technical skills predominating during the
early stages and managerial skills becoming
more important as the project matures.
With respect to the Aeronautical Engineering Duty
Officers (who hold most of the key management positions
within - and several outside - the Naval Air Systems
Command) the following information was found. The August
1975 issue of the Directory of Aeronautical Duty Officers
listed seven Flag, 68 Captain, 123 Commander, 105 Lieutenant
Commander, and 15 Lieutenant-grade officers and their
^2

educational backgrounds. Table III shows a breakdown of
the number and type of degrees held by these officers.
The information shown is extremely impressive. Three hun-
dred eighteen officers shared a total of 7^5 degrees; an
average of 2.33 Ver man. Advanced degrees made up slightly
less than half of the total number of degrees. Ninety-
six percent of the officers held at least one advanced
degree.
Brilliant though these statistics are, there is
another statistic which tends to cloud them: only 20$ of
the total number of advanced degrees are in the management
field whereas 80$ are in the engineering and science field.
While recognizing that this group of officers gains much
management education from on-the-job experience and also
from various training courses, it appears that today's
increasingly complex managerial duties call for more of
a technical-management balance in their formal education.
Evidence that this has been recognized may have been indi-
cated by the results of the most recent AEDO promotion
announcements. Of 15 out of 38 Commanders selected for
Captain, 33$ had advanced degrees in management. Of 19
out of 48 Lieutenant Commanders selected for Commander,
42$ had advanced degrees in management. Both figures
are well above the 20$ figure that would have been expected





NUMBER AND TYPE OF COLLEGE DEGREES HELD BY
AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING DUTY OFFICERS
AS OF AUGUST 1975
DEGREE AND FIELD FLAG CAPT CDR LCDR LT.
DOCTORATE
Technical 5 12 4
Management
ENGINEER
Technical 1 6 17 26
Management - - - - -
MASTERS
Technical 7 50 79 71 13
Management 1 15 31 25
BACHELORS
Technical 11 96 150 108 14
Management - 1 l 1
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3. Focus on Short-Term Goals
Relatively little information was found in this
area although it may well be the one which deserves the
most attention. Sushka /~1976, pp. 26-27_J7 touched on
this briefly:
Loyalty to any job for example is and
has been of a short-term nature in the Navy
and the short-term successes are the ones
attributed to the individual Navy project
manager. Long-term goals and ideas which
more acutely affect overall project per-
formance thus suffer by receiving less than
their share of interest and enthusiasm.
J. Ronald Fox /~197^, p. 198_7 comes down a bit
harder on the subject:
Program managers naturally want to impress
their military superiors favorably in order
to achieve high marks in their annual per-
formance ratings. Since officers serve for
a relatively short period in each assignment,
each program manager attempts to produce
spectacular results in the shortest possible
time. We visited a number of military bases
in Vietnam and Europe from I969 to 1971- At
each base the commanding officer gave us a
briefing on program activities. Unfailingly,
the briefing centered around graphs that began
at a low point on the left side, signifying
the time when the commander began his current
assignment. From the beginning of his assign-
ment to the present, the charts showed
remarkable progress. At the time of the
briefing, performance measured by the charts
was at an all time high - in every single
unit. Improvement was always attributed to
the current commanding officer's management
ability. We looked for one commander who
might begin his briefing by remarking: "When
I arrived at this assignment, my predecessor
was doing an outstanding job. I am pleased
to say that since that time I have continued
what he was doing and have maintained the
same high standards." We never found him.
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One colonel who had worked under three
highly respected general officers over a period
of five years pointed out that the present
system for evaluating and rewarding performance
precludes the pursuit of long-term goals. He
claimed that each of the three general officers
under whom he had served had "announced in
staff meetings that they were not interested
in long-term plans. Rather, they wanted to
know what could be done tomorrow."
One general officer expressed an even
more cynical point of view: "Remember, in
the Government it's the image, not the sub-
stance, that counts. If you're ineffective
and your boss likes you, you're o.k. But
even though you may be an effective producer,
if your boss doesn't share that belief in the
short run, you're in bad shape."
There are few rewards in the military
for the capable performance of a long-term
task. A short-term task that is done well
will be attributed to the present commander
and will be mentioned in his annual per-
formance rating. Maintaining stability in
program management and progressing efficiently
toward long-term program goals are not seen
as "rewarding" activities. They may lead to
the ultimate success of a program but they
do not often lead to outstanding performance
ratings for the responsible officer.
One reason that this vital subject has not been
discussed more may be that it is considered as just another
by-product of the policy of job rotation. This policy has
received considerable attention over the years, and is the
subject next discussed.
C. JOB ROTATION POLICIES
A relatively large amount of material, much of it crit-
ical in nature, was found concerning the policy of job
rotation. The criticism stems from both the civilian and
military sectors. Although there is a strong defense of
k6

the policy, the general tide seems to be running in favor
of making changes that would provide for longer average
tour lengths than those now in practice. This final
section of the literature search presents pertinent
information found concerning job rotation: (1) civilian
sector criticism, (2) military sector criticism, (3) mili-
tary sector defense, and (k) optimum tour length.
1. Civilian Sector Criticism
The frequent rotation of officers has long been
mentioned as a problem in the joint military - civilian
service organization. The second Hoover Commission Report
ZT1955, PP. 37-38J7 indicated that:
The tenure of officer personnel in sup-
port activities is generally too short to
provide either efficient management or ef-
fective training. The principal faults of
present officer assignment practices are
these:
1. An officer does not have a chance
to learn an assignment before he is moved
on to the next one
.
2. The excessive rotation practices
are a hardship on the officer and his family.
3. The excessive rotation practices
are a hardship on the civilians who must
maintain the continuity in the support
activities and must instruct the new. of-
ficers in their work.
•
k. Efficiency of the support activities
suffers because of lost time involved in
making the transition from one officer to
the next and problems of long-term motivation
because of sustained tenure.
5. It is an expensive practice - counting




Rotation is very effective as a develop-
mental device and is commonly used in business
and industry for the development of top-level
executive talent. But it is unrealistic to
assume that the assignment of officers to
support activities for exceedingly short
periods of time either constitutes training
or is of benefit to the support activities.
In their famous work, "The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis," Peck and Scherer /~1962,
PP- 93~9^_7 had this to say about job rotation:
•
The U.S. armed services have long believed
in broadening the experience of their military-
officers by frequent rotation of personnel from
one job to another. Traditionally, the rotation
cycle has been three years or less. Rotation
has many desirable aspects, particularly as a
means of developing officers for broader exe-
cutive responsibilities and preventing them
from becoming stagnant, and in fact many large
industrial corporations also move employees
with executive potential frequently, although
usually to another job in the same functional
area. But since it usually takes one or two
years for a person to obtain a thorough working
knowledge of the technology and personalities
involved in a complex weapons program, rotation
can interfere seriously with the smooth admin-
istration of programs. The rapid turnover of
U.S. weapons project officers has been the
subject of much criticism. Schlaifer, for
example, found unduly short tours of duty a
serious problem in the development of U.S.
aircraft engines during the 1930' s. More
recently, the Robertson Committee concluded
that the duty tours of aircraft weapons pro-
ject officers should be lengthened beyond the
26- to 32-month average which prevailed during
the early 1950' s. Yet our case studies con-
ducted during the late 1950's indicated that
rapid turnover of project officers remained
a problem.
The Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel /~1970, p. 1-3




OFFICERS PROMOTED IN I969 TO GRADE 0-7 — NUMBER
OF ASSIGNMENTS
NUMBER NUMBER OF AVERAGE AVERAGE MONTHS
SERVICE PROMOTED ASSIGNMENTS PER OFFICER PER ASSIGNMENT
Array- 59 1,360 23.1 13.1
Navy 39 893 22.9 13.6
Air Force 76 1,442 19.0 lbA
Total 17^ 3,695 21.2 13.7
TABLE V
TOTAL PERIOD IN DIFFENT TYPES OF ASSIGNMENT
OPERATIONAL/
SERVICE COMMAND SCHOOL STAFF TOTAL
Army 8 yrs 10 mos 7 yrs 9 yrs 2 mos 25.0 yrs
Navy 10 yrs 11 mos k yrs 3 mos 11 yrs 6 mos 26.0 yrs
Air
Force 6 yrs 11 mos 3 yrs 3 mos 12 yrs 7 mos 22.0 yrs 9 mos
Total 8 yrs 3 mos k yrs 9 mos 11 yrs 3 mos 2^.0 yrs 3 mos
^9

The Blue Ribbon Panel /"p. 137_J? also made the fol-
lowing comment:
The system of rotation not only fails to
provide management and leadership needed on
the job, but also has deficiencies in accom-
plishing its stated purpose - the development
of the officer himself. Men are not developed
by being observers; they must have responsi-
bility. From the point of view of the position
to be filled, as well as the best interests of
the officer himself, his job assignments should
be of sufficient duration so that he can become
thoroughly involved in the work and be fully
responsible for results.
Berry and Peckham, in their thesis "Interactions of
Navy Program Managers with Congressional Committees and
their Staffs" ^fl973, pp. 55, 58, 59, and 66J7, relate
the following:
Congressional staff members, DOD civilian
personnel and non-DOD personnel suggested
that it often takes years for Congressional
knowledge, combined with hard work, to create
trust in the individual by the Congressional
participants.
Although many program managers can convince
congressmen and Congressional staffs of their
personal trustworthiness, this was described
as normally taking a year or more. Congress
must have time to assess the individual, to
observe how he prepares for them and how he
responds to them. Each program manager must
"sell" himself to Congress and build his own
trust.
. . . another reason given for a lack of
trust in the program manager comes from not
knowing the program manager well, and the
feeling that he can't know his program
thoroughly. Many complained that program
managers who are in their jobs for three
years or less don't gain sufficient know-
ledge to understand all the problems involved




In fact, Congressional personnel in gen-
eral criticized the relatively short tours
of the Navy in all billets that interact with
Congress.
J. Ronald Fox £~197b, pp. 183-18*J_7 stated that every
industry manager he interviewed was unhappy about the fre-
quent turnover of Government management personnel on program
performance. He gave several typical comments such as follow
The change of military personnel every two
or three years leads to lack of responsibility
on the part of both government and industry.
There were three project managers on the
/~name_7 project, all of them general rank,
in the space of the three years of the project.
Each had a slightly different way in which he
wanted to work with us.
/"Name of company_7 would be in serious
difficulty if they took their key trained
men out of the project offices and periodi-
cally sent them to other places outside the
field of project management. We simple could
not tolerate that personnel turbulence and
complete the programs on time or within the
budget.
The most recent civilian sector criticism came from
the Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for
Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) as reported in
the Program Managers Newsletter /Summer 1975. P- 28_7.
There is something wrong with assuming that
a military man is so competent that he can be
a good program manager for a couple of years,
then go on and be good at something else; then
be a good General, and finally a good Chief of
Staff. It is just not possible to find people
with that degree breadth in the main. If it
were possible to find them the government, the
system would not pay them enough. I see no
way to assume that we can get this magic com-
petence that allows people to be equally good
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at program management and fighting and
comptrolling and R&D-ing along with every-
thing else.
2. Military Sector Criticism
Criticism of the job rotation policy has been almost
as voluble from the military sector as from the civilian.
Paulsen /~1965, pp. 6, 28J7 wrote as follows.
.
The rotation of officers in the joint
military-civil service organization is
considered to be too frequent for either
efficient management or effective training.
The officer does not have sufficient time
to learn his new assignment and the capa-
bilities of his personnel before he is moved
to his next assignment. The civil servants
are required to maintain continuity in the
organization; however, this task is extremely
difficult when the people to whom they report
are continually changing.
Although the frequent rotation of officers
is good experience and helps the individual
develop, it adversely affects the efficiency
of the organization. Even though he may
be a competent officer, the learning time
required for him to be a competent manager of
the new organization may be in excess of
one year. In the meantime, he is in danger
of hindering the work, irritating his sub-
ordinates and exposing his ignorance by
making judgments and decisions which he is
not at that point qualified to make. Until
he learns the competence of his staff, he
does not know whom he can trust or how much
faith to put in their recommendations. This
tends to slow progress and limits the dele-
gation of responsibility to appropriate
levels. Another problem that may develop
is the failure of the rotating manager to
develop an adequate feeling for long-range
planning. He may be inclined to make deci-
sions on the basis of what is good for the
organization now and give no consideration
to the long-range effect of the decision.
He seldom has the important motivational
satisfaction of "seeing a job through."
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Although the civilian side of the organi-
zation is supposed to provide continuity, the
different policies and procedures of each new
officer keeps the organization pretty turbu-
lent. Changes are sometimes made "by incoming
officers because of past methods of operating
even though existing methods might be just
as effective.
Paulsen /"pp. 37-39_7 also reports the results of
an opinion survey he conducted with officers of the Civil
Engineer Corps and their subordinate civilian staff. Three
of the questions and answers are given below, along with
comments that accompanied them.
Question (1): Does the rotation of officers
every two years reduce the effectiveness of




Officer comments . Several indicated that
the answer to this question would be "no" for
lower ranks and "yes" for higher ranks. Some
that answered "yes" stated that there are
many advantages to this practice. The rotation
of Military Managers provides a fresh look at
old problems. They have no vested interest
and can look at the problems from an objective
viewpoint. Several that answered "no" said
that three years would be better.
Civilian comments . Concurred with comments
of officers above. Generally agreed that three
years would be better than two. In two years,
an officer barely has time and opportunity to
establish changes in procedure, organization
and techniques in accordance with his ideas.
Also, incompetent civilians stay in their
jobs because effective removal action is
not completed when supervisor is transferred
and the man gets a new start with the next
officer. If the tour of duty were three years,
the officer would have to live with some of
his decisions and would be able to improve
them. Also after three years there would be
less possibility of a new officer making major
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changes, thus eliminating or reducing the
usual two-year upheaval and change
.
Question (2): With officers rotating
every two years, do you think that it is
possible for an officer to make improvements




Officer comments . Several qualified their
"yes" answer "by saying that the amount of
improvements he can accomplish in that time
is limited. Others said that the amount he
can accomplish depends on the officer. An
officer can make improvements in two years
by using his knowledge, experience and the
sound application of management principles.
Civilian comments . Several said "yes"
but limited. Some indicated that this causes
more problems than anything else. One answered
"no - only confusion."
Question (^): Do you think that changes
are sometimes made by incoming officers because
of their past methods of operating even though




(No comments by either officers or civilians.)
Allen and Loftus /~1973. P- 7_7 had this to add
concerning Project Managers:
Up to now the project managers have been
selected from the available officers from
the unrestricted and restricted line communi-
ties who are best qualified for the project
in question. There has been no concerted
effort to prepare officers who will have the
specific mixture of knowledge, skill and
experience required for the position. As
a result the project manager usually spends
the first six months filling in the gaps in
his background. The impression that an
5^

officer qualified for command of an operating
unit should be equally qualified to be a
project manager has not always proven true.
Sushka /"1976, pp. 25, 26, and 111_7 agreed with
the above
:
As with the many similar difficulties
faced by both the civilian and military pro-
ject managers, so also are there problem
areas that have been and are unique to- the
military manager.
For example, he is usually but a part-
• time representative to the project group to
which he is primarily responsible. The
concept of job rotation may have been use-
ful in the past, however, the problem it
now creates in the increasingly specialized
field of procurement management makes the
concept an anachronism of the 1970* s.
For instance, RADM R. G. Freeman, III,
USN, recently said in a November 1975 speech,
that the Navy is still not picking all its
project managers with the right qualifications
and education, experience and expertise.
Instead, many officers are selected as pro-
ject managers as a reward for prior excellence
in operational performance, not in the sys-
tems acquisition field, and which in any
case is not necessarily a measure of a
good project manager.
On December 9, 1971, Admiral H. G. Rickover discussed
the problem of personnel turnover during the Senate Armed
Forces Committee Hearings on the Weapon System Acquisition
Process.
In the Defense Department there is the
problem that those who are running the pro-
jects are around for only two to three years.
The DOD looks for quick solutions to solve
all its management problems. They designate
technically inexperienced persons as "project
managers." The problem is then considered
solved and at. once forgotten. But these
managers do not have the technical skill to
see to it that their project is properly
conceived and carried out. Most have only
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the shallowest knowledge of the theory of
the techniques they must deal with and
little experience with the practical pro-
blems involved. Under our rotation system,
they are never kept long enough on the job
to acquire such skill and knowledge.
As if this did not make their task
difficult enough, they are subject to con-
stant interference from upper echelon
"bureaucrats pushing their personal pro-
posals, seeking to have their "advanced"
concepts put into effect. With all these
pressures upon him, the neophyte manager
during his brief tour of duty will barely
learn to understand these proposals, still
less to weigh them and arrive at a judgment
he can forcefully defend. Nevertheless, he
must make decisions vitally affecting his
project, decisions which may be technically
unsound but will satisfy his superiors, and
- so will take effect. This is how a project
becomes irrevocably set.
Before the results of the decisions are
in, the manager will have moved and a new
manager, equally unqualified technically, will
take his place. Naturally the new manager
will feel no responsibility for prior decisions
and actions; his primary ambition will be to
keep the project moving in the hope that it
will not fail during his own tour. Thus
responsibility cannot be fixed and there is
bound to be little continuity in technical
direction for most of the defense developments
under way today.
The ultimate Navy criticism of the rotation system
was perhaps expressed in the following excerpt from a December
1969 article by Kenneth Turan of The Washington Post .
Rear Admiral James Calvert, superin-
tendant of the Navy Academy, announced at
yesterday's annual Army-Navy Luncheon at
the Touchdown Club that Coppedge, who has
been athletic director since June I968 will
retire from the service in July to take the
post as a civilian.
The admiral said the change to' a civilian
director is "absolutely essential, if the Naval
Academy's program is to catch and overtake
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those on our schedule in football and 20
other sports." Navy takes a 1-8 record,
its worst in more than 20 years, into the
November 29 game with Army.
Admiral Calvert emphasized that "by
constantly changing our athletic director
every two or three years we have destroyed
continuity which is necessary to an ef-
fective athletic administration," and
Coppedge agreed, saying "if you had a
- million-and-a-half dollar business, would
you want to change bosses every three years
for someone who didn't have any experience?"
Previously, the athletic director's post
was simply another two to three year tour
of duty for career Navy men. "Most directors
come right from sea duty to this job,"
Coppedge said, "and it can take a full year
to get to know the ropes . When I became
director I barely knew the NCAA ground rules.
How many people in the Navy do you think
know about things like scheduling problems?"
3. Military Sector Defense
In addition to certain positive aspects of the job
rotation policy noted in portions of the above criticisms,
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report /""1970, Appendix N,
PP« 35~36_7 contained the following which perhaps best
represents the military sector defense of the system.
,0ne persistent problem of the JCS, and,
indeed, of all the military, is maintenance
of continuity, or to turn the issue around,
the lack of a corporate memory. Unlike a
civilian organization, the JCS has no people
with continuous memory of past operations
beyond the last three years. Historical
records are an inadequate substitute for
a living memory for the purposes of the
JCS.
A partial solution to the problem lies
in a longer tenure for Joint Staff officers.
There are powerful objections to this ap-
proach, however, the main one being that
a longer than usual tour would break an
officer's career pattern adversely. The
average officer still tends to view service
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on the Joint Staff as disadvantageous in a
career sense, and consequently any lengthened
tour would be resented. Even general of-
ficers expressed concern over career dis-
abilities which can result from Joint Staff
service. The solution to this problem lies
in the Service career and promotion policies.
Any longer tour system must be so arranged
with the Services as not to affect adversely
an officer's career.
Another objection, the official JCS one,
to longer tours on the Joint Staff is that
the Staff requires officers who have been
in recent contact with the forces in order
to inject realism into Joint Staff operations.
They want an officer who is a well-grounded
generalist, familiar with field operations
as well as staff work. It is felt that a
tour longer than three years might well
lead to a loss of creativity and certainly
of contact with the forces. This supposed
reduction of quality would have to be
balanced against the benefits of a longer
tour with the Joint Staff.
There is a questionable aspect to this
argument. The JCS claim that they must
depend upon the Services to provide realism
and to inject contact with the forces into
the JCS decision-making process. At the
same time, the JCS argues that its officers
cannot have longer tours because of their
need in their JCS duties for recent field
contact. Also, this argument presumes that
officers come to the Joint Staff direct
from the forces, which is certainly no
longer the norm. The JCS further point
out that the problem is partially eased
by bringing officers back for a second tour
on the Joint Staff at some later stage in
their careers. This is quite common now
for senior officers, and many of the general
officers currently on the Staff have pre-
viously served there as colonels or lieutenant
colonels
.
Perhaps the solution lies in some flexi-
ble formula for personnel tours. Inducements
could be created to encourage officers to
stay on longer, provided they are useful.
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This would be especially so in the case of
men who were approaching the end of their
careers, so long as this prospect had not
brought about a loss of motivation.
k. Optimum Tour Length
The literature contained a considerable amount of
material concerning what the optimum tour length should be.
Although there was a fairly wide range of opinions the general
consensus appeared to favor a tour length of around four
years. Following are some of the opinions found arranged
in order of shortest to longest tour lengths.
In his opinion survey of Civil Engineer Corps officers
and civilians, Paulsen £~1965* P- 38_7 got the following
response:
Question (3): What length tour of duty
for officers would you consider optimum for
efficiency of organization and providing
executive development necessary for the
officer to assume positions of higher re-
sponsibility?
2 yrs 3 yrs k yrs Over k yrs
Officers 22 60 5
Civilians 18 37 25 2
Officer comments . General feeling was
that tours should be two years for junior
officers up to lieutenant commander and
three or four years for lieutenant com-
mander and above. A few stated that it
would depend on the billet.
Civilian comments . Same as officer comments.
Although above numbers indicate the civilians
tend more towards four year tours than of-
ficers do.
The Report of the 1969 - 1970 Navy Weapon Systems
Acquisition Management Study group recommended that initial
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tour lengths for project managers "be established as three
years, with extensions beyond this period depending on the
status of the project.
On December 10, 1970, the House Committee on Govern-
ment operations expressed some doubts about a three-year tour
length:
It is fair to ask whether the new call
for expertise in program management squares
with policy and practice regarding the
rotation of military officers. The new
goal is three-year tours of duty for
program managers. It is difficult to
see how three-year tours of duty for mili-
tary officers will enable them to gain the
degree of technical and managerial expertise
that Mr. Packard emphasized so strongly.
Development projects frequently are main-
tained for much longer periods. The concept
of expertise that Admiral Rickover espouses,
and Mr. Packard seems to endorse, is asso-
ciated with rigorous technical training,
career professionalism, and longer tenure
than even a three-year tour of duty.
This opinion was consistent with that expressed
16 years earlier when the same Committee conducted hearings
on the organization and administration of military research
and development programs:
There was much testimony concerning an
optimum period for a tour of duty for a
military officer in a technical assignment.
Even the Department of Defense officials
admitted that a two-year tour of duty was
inadequate. Although a three-year tour is_
apparently recommended by departmental policy,
various reasons were cited for failure to
adhere to this policy. Evidence of this_
may be found in the testimony. The testimony
of our leading scientist witnesses and
witnesses from the Department of Defense
appeared to favor a four-year tour of duty.
Such a period would permit a thorough in-
doctrination of an officer who might become
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competent enough to assume direction over
certain elements of a research program.
Sushka /"1976, pp. 89-92, and 107_7 gave the following
information:
In an October 1975 speech, Vice Admiral
E. Co Waller, III, Director of Weapons System
Evaluation Group and a former project manager
quoted the current figures on the present
average tour length of Navy project managers
as twenty-seven months. This figure indicates
that even five years after numerous directives
were issued regarding increased project manager
tour lengths, Navy project managers are still
"being rotated in and out of their jobs too
quickly. Although the current average tour
length of two plus years is greater than it
was five years ago, it still does not approach
the four to five years length recommended by
almost every study group or commission assigned
to investigate project management (e.g., Blue
Ribbon Committee, LMI Reports, DOD Directives,
etc. ) .
This is not to say that many managers, both
civilian and military felt that officer rotation
was all bad. If carried out at a four to five
year interval, most personnel interviewed con-
sidered the adverse impact to be negligible
and offset by the fresh views, up to date
technical education and fresh fleet experience
that the new military manager would bring with
him. It is rather the unplanned for or uncertain
changes resulting in rotation after only two
or three years that causes the difficulty
and impacts upon the previously discussed areas
of time (increases it), authority (lessens it)
and risk taking (lessens it). Rotation is
in fact looked at by many military officers
as a positive motivational factor and an
incentive but only if it is carried out in
a prescribed four to*- five year interval with
no sudden or unannounced changes
.
J. Ronald Fox /"p. 183_J7 found that industry managers
believed that four years was too short a time for the assign-
ment of a government program manager to a program. They
felt he should be there long enough to evaluate the present
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program and help in the source selection process for the
next one
.
And finally, Berry and Peckham /~1973, P* 73_7
indicated that Congress desired even longer tour lengths
for officers dealing directly with them:
It was suggested by many that tours in
this type of duty should he open-ended; if
any individual performs well in the system,
consider the possibility of a six- or seven-
year tour, with appropriate compensations,
in order that the trust and knowledge developed
can be utilized to good advantage by the Navy.
This completes the literature search conducted to
satisfy the general objective of this thesis. It has
examined the internal and external forces (career pattern
complexity, promotion and attendant processes, and job
rotation policies) that bear on the military officer during
his management tour in the supporting Shore Establishment
and influence the decisions he makes.
The next section concerns the specific objective
of this thesis which is to determine whether or not the two
hypotheses described in the Introduction are true.
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III. TEST OF HYPOTHESES
In this section the methodology used to test each of
the two hypotheses defined in the Introduction will be




The basic methodology used to test the hypotheses was
statistical analysis of data collected by means of mailed
questionnaires
.
1. The Sample Frame
The sample frame chosen for the test was the Aero-
nautical Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO) community. This
relatively small group of approximately 318 officers holds
many of the key management billets within the Naval Air
Systems Command Headquarters and Field Activities. They
also hold key billets with Fleet Staffs and other head-
quarters such as the Naval Electrical Systems Command, the
Naval Material Command, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. The Directory of Aeronautical Engineering Duty
Officers published each six months lists each officer, his
social security number, date of rank, education degree
major, duty station billet, month and year for present bil-
let tour dates, rank, and year group. From the information
contained therein it was found that there were a total of
eighty-four Captain billets available, and only seven Flag
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"billets. Since the premise of the Hypotheses is that some
billets are more desirable than others for promotion purposes,
it was decided that these eighty-four Captain billets would
provide an ideal group to study. Not only were these Cap-
tain billets well-enough known to the AEDO community to
elicit meaningful opinions about them, but also their number
was large enough to serve as a significant statistical base
for testing both Hypothesis One and Hypothesis Two.
2. Data Collection
Data was collected by means of two questionnaires.
These are described below:
a. Questionnaire One
Using information from the August 1975 edition
of the Directory of Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officers
,
a questionnaire was designed which listed each of the eighty-
four Captain billets and contained instructions for rating
each billet with a numerical score for its desirability as
a springboard to Flag rank. This questionnaire, along with
its forwarding letter, is shown in Appendix A. The intended
use of the questionnaire was to determine the mean score
each billet received, and then to use these mean scores to
rank each billet relative to each other in order of pre-
ference. This ranking could then be used to test Hypothesis
One.
b. Questionnaire Two
This questionnaire was designed to collect data
for use in testing Hypothesis Two. Basically it requested
information on the terms of office of all incumbents holding
6k

each of the eighty-four billets since i960. This question-
naire, along with its letter of transmittal, -is shown in
Appendix B. The intended use of this questionnaire was
to determine the average tour length of incumbents who had
served in each billet. This information was then to be cor-
related with the information obtained from Questionnaire
One in order to test Hypothesis Two.
B. DATA ANALYSIS
1. Ranking of Billets
Copies of the Appendix A questionnaire were mailed
to all 67 Captains and 122 Commanders listed in the August
1975 Directory of Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officers .
The 122 Commanders included 15 who had just been selected
for Captain. In addition, the questionnaire was mailed to
19 Lieutenant Commanders who had just been selected for
Commander. This mailing list was selected to encompass
all those officers who are, or will be in the near future,
in contention for the 8^ available Captain billets. The
response was extremely good. Usable questionnaires were
returned by 62 Captains and 106 Commanders for a grand
total response of 81$.
A number of the returned questionnaires contained
remarks showing a high degree of interest in the project.
In view of the valuable insight these remarks gave on the
thinking and attitudes of the respondents , some of the
more pertinent ones are included below:
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Captain A ; I am troubled "by your request
for an opinion concerning the relationship be-
tween an AED billet and Flag rank. I feel
you are implying that the billet makes a Cap-
tain a Flag officer. If this is your thesis,
it is not sound. There are an average of nine
(six to 1^) in the Captain year groups that
have yet to be picked over to produce Flag
officers. In each year group there are one
or two officers that are superior quality (as
measured by the fitness report system) and
have been superior quality most of their 20
to 30 years of active duty (we usually make
Captain around 20 years and Flag by 30)
.
These individuals are the ones that make
Flag. They do not make Flag by having served
in a particular billet - they were potential
Flag officers (because of the documented
quality performance) before going into any
billet. In other words, the man makes the
job - not the job making the man. This kind
of recognized quality Captain is selected
for a job, recognizing the demands of a job,
(and how important it is that the individual's
probability of failure to perform well in that
job is low) because he is the best available.
When the job is less demanding and therefore
less important, in the grand scheme of things,
the poorer (lesser) quality Captain is assigned.
Captain B : Basic point not addressed is
that people make Flag, billets don't. Some-
times people assignments are driven by other
factors than billet desirability.
Captain C : It seems to me that "Is" would
tend to be assigned to billets from which recent
Flag selections have been made (PMA.-2^, CNAL
Force Material Officer) instead of what you may
have been seeking (assigning "Is" for lower,
stepping stone billets which normally would
be occupied by more junior Captains) - these
good junior billets will probably get a "3."
Captain D : I don't really buy your assump-
tion that duty assignment is an important
factor in promotion to Flag rank for AEDs,
hence my limited spread in marks. If assign-
ment is a factor, it's not a constant one,
i.e., a particular billet may provide good^
exposure one year and not the next, depending
on what's going on.
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Captain E : My marks are, of course, as
"I see it." My gradings are to some extent
biased "by who now has the job and how well
others, who have had the job in the past,
have done in their "quest for the stars."
(Also some bias must creep in on the jobs I
have had myself!) I did not grade any job
lower than 5 since I think, to some extent,
the man makes the job. There is no job that
rates a 6 or 7 if a good performer is put
into it. (The less desirable jobs don't seem
to go to the good guys -- or is it the other
way around?)
Captain F ; With the present push from
DEPSECDEF Clements on Project Management,
ideal timing is to be PM in funded program.
Captain G t (Fleet Staffs) are among the
first positions to be filled. (Rework/Repair
Activities) jobs get filled soon thereafter,
but are premeditated. I provide this with a
known bias. My background has kept me in
touch with how the priorities have been given
to selecting 06's and senior 05' s for these
positions. Those positions which are selected
first are given to the highly desirable despite
where they are currently assigned. A look at
the statistics will show some officers move
every year or two. Those are the ones in
"favor." Any prudent group of Flags would
use the same selection processes. Nevertheless,
each billet has tremendous responsibility and
an officer's achievement in the billet is related
to his background, experience, ambition, and
ingenuity. Some billets have more Flag visi-
bility and therefore might seem more desirable.
However, not all program manager jobs are a
steal since there are often strong biases
against the program in OPNAV - OSD - Congress
that can cause any PM to pull his hair out.
Captain H i We might observe that the CO
jobs tend to run to the upper half performers,
as do the TYCOM jobs and a few others. So
you quickly get involved with the "job makes
the man" versus "man makes the job" syndrome.
Then when you try enough correlation to make
opinion, you find the sample size amazingly
small (statistically insignificant)? All
above is especially interesting when you mix
it with the small opportunity for Flag (odds)
and the special instructions to the Flag
board each year. These special charges to
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the board have been varied and have shown
the effect of what is in vogue this year.
Summary - best jobs as platform/springboard
to Flag - any string of assignments with
sustained ^.0+ performance, ending with the
right kind of man fitting the right-talent-
to-be-emphasized- this-year, and a good sponsor
on the board; and good service reputation with
the URL Flag officers on the board.
Commander A : You might consider screening
out my reply along with all other passed
over Commanders (after testing for significant
difference) since I suspect we have a biased
view, i.e., no Captain billet seems "undesirable"
to us, but we don't pay much attention, anymore,
to how one makes Admiral!
Commander B : Doesn't this merely measure
the perception of the actual historic success
rate of incumbents?
Commander C ; There is a definite difference
in assignment of a junior or senior Captain to
billets that you don't account for.
Commander D ; Having recent Naval Air
Systems Command experience, I am familiar
with the promotional health of most NAVAIR
projects/billets. In my opinion, some may
appear to be fertile from a promotion aspect
but in fact are potential booby traps and lose
desirability due to inherent management pro-
blems existing at this time. I have applied
this dimension to my ranking.
Commander E : Most AEDO Admirals are se-
lected from those officers who have spent a
great deal of time in Washington. Especially
those who have been successful as PMA's.
Commander F ; You have undoubtedly detected
that I value the NAVAIR program manager's jobs
as best in this context. That's where the
visibility is. That's where a good Captain
sinks or swims. A super job as a PM is in
my opinion a sure path to Flag rank. It is
also a good way to an early grave. I wouldn't
touch those jobs with a ten-foot pole.
The data contained in the returned questionnaires
was computer-processed by use of the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) by Nie, Rent, and Hull (1970).
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The mean score of each of the 8^ Captain billets rated was
determined for Captain responses only, Commander responses
only, and for all responses in consensus. Table VI shows
the relative consensus ranking of these billets. For added
information, Table VI* also shows the relative ranking of
these billets as scored by Captains only and by Commanders
only. A Chi-square test was applied to the ranked mean
score data to test the hypothesis that the sample data came
from a population having a normal distribution. It was
concluded that, at the 1% level of significance, the sample
distribution was consistent with the hypothesis that the
parent distribution was normal.
Based on this finding, and for additional information,
a t-test was made for each billet to determine if the mean
score ratings assigned by the Captain-group differed from
those assigned by the Commander- group. Table VI denotes,
by means of an asterisk, those billets found to have a
rating difference at the 5% level of significance. Appendix
C shows the t-test computer print-out as well as the mean
scores of the billets as graded by the Captain and Commander
groups
.
A final t-test determined that there was a signi-
ficant difference between the overall mean score ratings
of the Captain and Commander groups at the Ifo level of
significance.
2. Correlation of Billet Rank and Tour Length
Copies of the Appendix B questionnaire were sent
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8^ AEDO Captain billets. Response was good with replies
received from 36 of the 40 activities. The four abstain-
ing were NAVELEXSYSCOMHQ, NAVMATCOMHQ , NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ, and
SECDEF (RDT&E).
An analysis of the returned data was made on a
billet-by-billet basis to determine the average tour length
of the incumbents of each billet over the years since i960.
Only data that indicated a normal duty assignment was con-
sidered. All data which indicated "acting" or otherwise
brief tours outside the indicated pattern was discarded.
It was found that *J4 of the billets yielded data from which
a meaningful average tour length could be determined. These
are listed below in Table VII
.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE TOUR LENGTH BY AEDO CAPTAIN BILLET
Consensus
Rank Billet Months
1 COMNAVAIRLANT Force Material Officer 26.6
3 NARF North Island CO 27.0
4 COMNAVAIRPAC Assistant Force Material Officer 25-8
6 NARF Alameda CO 31.0
9 NARF Norfolk CO 27-7
10 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT CO 32.6
11 NARF Jacksonville CO 2^.0
12 NARF Pensacola CO 29-0
15 NADC Warminister Director 31.
3
20 OSD (DDR&E) Mil Ast - Sys Acq Mgmt 3-3-0
22 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC CO 30.7
Zh NAVPERS AED-AMD-AIRSYS 2^.0







28 COMNAVAIRPAC Acft Prog and Eng 22.8
29 NAEC Lakehurst CO 29.5
30 NAILSC CO 23 >3
32 NAVPRO Bethpage CO 28.0
33 NAFI CO 28.0
3k NPTC Trenton CO 30.8
36 ONR Wash Dep and Ast Chief 27.7
38 PMTC Pt Mugu Dir Proj Mgmt 31.0
kO NAVPRO Burbank CO 33.6
4-1 NAVPRO Dallas CO 31.3
4-5 NATF Lakehurst CO 30
.
7
^6 NATC Pax Sys Engineering Div 2^.0
52 NAVPRO Long Beach CO 30.^
53 NAVPRO East Hartford CO 30
.
5^ NAVPRO Columbus CO 26.0
55 NAVPRO Stratford CO 22.0
58 PMTC Pt Mugu Dir Fleet Sup 35.5
60 NESTED Det Pax CO 26.8
65 NRB London CO 33.2
66 INSURV Wash DC Sen Mem BIS kO.k
67 NADC Warminster Chief of Staff 25-3
72 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT Rework Mgmt Jk.k
73 NADC Warminster Dir Air Vehicle Dept 30.0
77 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC Fleet Support 32.3
78 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC Dpty 3^-3
79 MSDO Director 26.0
80 NAVAIRSYSCOMREPLANT NAVPRO Mgmt 29.2
81 NAEC Lakehurst GSE 29-5
82 Safety Center Dir OSHA 30.0
83 ASO Phila Tech Dir 33-2
8^ NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC QA 29-7
76

A linear regression analysis was made using the
above data in order to determine if any correlation existed
between consensus billet-ranking and average tour length.
A plot of this regression analysis, along with accompanying
statistics, is shown in Figure 1. From the plot, a Pearson's
Correlation Coefficient of .31 was obtained, plus a positive-
sloping linear regression line. To determine if the Cor-
relation Coefficient was statistically significant the null
hypothesis that there was zero correlation was tested. The
null hypothesis was rejected because if it were true such a
relatively high Correlation Coefficient would occur with
probability less than 2$. Similarly, to determine if the
slope of the linear regression line was statistically sig-
nificant, the null hypothesis that there was zero slope
was tested. Again, the null hypothesis was rejected because
if it were true such a relatively high slope would occur
with probability less than 2%.
Because of the previously found difference in the
mean score billet rankings by the Captain and Commander
groups, it was decided to run a linear regression analysis
against these groups separately. Figure 2 shows the linear
regression plot and, accompanying statistics for billet
rankings determined by the Captain-group. Figure 3 shows
the same for billet rankings determined by the Commander-
group. The Captain- ranked data provided a higher Correlation
Coefficient (.38) than the consensus-opinion data, while
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lower. The plots in both Figure 2 and Figure 3 exhibited
positive slopes. Statistical testing showed that the Cor-
relation Coefficients and linear regression line slopes
were significant at the 5% level for both opinion groups.
In addition, a statistical test determined, at the $% level
of significance, that all regression lines were linear.
C
. FINDINGS
The results of all the above statistical tests tend to
support the Hypotheses of this thesis.
With respect to Hypothesis One, the results of Question-
naire One showed that the available Captain-billet choices
were ranked in a normal distribution by the respondents. The
billets appearing in the tails of the distribution clearly
indicate that certain Naval Shore Establishment billets
are perceived by the military manager as being more desirable
than others for promotion purposes. The most desirable jobs
were found to be those that carried a high degree of responsi-
bility and afforded a great amount of visibility to the
incumbent, i.e., program managers and commanding officers
of the larger activities, such as the Naval Air Rework Faci-
lities. The least desirable jobs were found to be those that
afforded lesser degrees of responsibility and visibility,
i.e., department or division-head jobs at the larger activities
The most desirable jobs, then, tended to be of the "senior
Captain" variety, and the least desirable jobs of the "junior
Captain" type. The fact that an officer may progress from a
"junior Captain" billet to a "senior Captain" billet and
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thence to Flag rank may account for the finding that no
billet was ranked any lower than ""below average" for pro-
motion purposes. This may also account for the finding
that the Commander and Captain groups were significantly
different in their billet rating opinions.
With respect to Hypothesis Two, the results of the
linear regression analysis showed that there was an inverse
relationship between the most desirable military management
billets perceived as springboards, to promotion and average
tour lengths. In- the case of the Aeronautical Engineering
Duty Officers, however, the actual effect of this relationship
was small, i.e., the least desirable billets had average
tour lengths only four or five months longer than the most
desirable billets. (The average overall tour length was
29.2 months.) It was also found that the degree of correlation
between billet desirability and average tour length was
significantly higher when the billets were rated by the




IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The information presented in this thesis is summarized
below:
The military officer in general, and the Naval
officer in particular, is faced with the following three
"basic factors which greatly influence his career "behavior:
(1) Career pattern complexity, (2) Promotion and attendant
processes, and (3) Job rotation policies.
Career pattern complexity has increased markedly
over the last decade and has led to some specialization away
from the Unrestricted Line Officer and toward the Restricted
Duty Line Officer. The emerging role of the military manager
requires directing personnel in both the civil service and
military systems; and exercising greater skills in manage-
ment technqiues and practices. All the above has given rise
to the following stress points: (1) relationships between
civilian and military personnel, (2) officer-enlisted rela-
tionships, (3) continuous readjustment to new working environ-
ments and personnel, (^) continuous pressure for "outstand-
ing performance and conduct" with the up or out philosophy,
and (5) fear of ruining career with one mistake.
Promotion and attendant processes include: (1) the
acquisition of desired duty assignments, (2) adequate
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preparation for good performance within assignment, and
(3) focus on short-term goals. Within available choices,
certain Naval Shore Establishment billets were found to be
perceived by the military manager as being more desirable
than others for promotion purposes. There appears to be
a growing awareness that as the military officer progresses
to higher-level positions, he needs less of his technical
training and more training in management skills. Promotion
policies were found to orient the military officer to the •
accomplishment of short-term goals vice long-term objectives.
The policy of job rotation was found to have possibly
the greatest effect on military officer career behavior.
Basic criticism of the practice was found to be: (1) an
officer does not have a chance to learn an assignment before
he is moved on to the next one, (2) the excessive rotation
practices are a hardship on the officer and his family,
(3) the excessive rotation practices are a hardship on the
civilians who must maintain the continuity in the support
activities and must instruct the new officers in their work,
(k) efficiency of the support activities suffers because of
lost time involved in making the transition from one officer
to the next and the problems of long-term motivation because
of sustained tenure, and (5) it is an expensive practice -
counting training costs, lost time, and moving and travel
costs. Defense of the practice was that it is a very good
tool for development of top-level executive talent, and
brings a fresh new viewpoint to the solution of long-standing
problems. Attention on the job rotation policy centered not
8^

on it's abolishment, "but on the question of longer tour
lengths such as four to five years vice the two to three
year length in general use. It was found that the most
desirable military management billets perceived as spring-
boards to promotion have average tour lengths significantly
shorter than those of less desirable billets.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Taken as a whole, the material contained in this thesis
seems to boil down to two main findings of vital concern:
(1) Career pattern complexities, promotion and attendant
processes and job rotation policies have all combined to
create a force which tends to work directly against the
proven good management tenants of stability and continuity
in the executive positions of greatest responsibility.
(2) The present emphasis on technical and scientific
formal education in the backgrounds of military officers is
not properly suited to support them in the top-level mana-
gerial positions they will occupy in the joint military-
civil service support activity at the later stages of their
careers.
The best avenue toward solution of the first problem
appears to be through amendment of the job rotation policy
rather than through amendment of career pattern complexities,
or promotion and attendant processes. In today's world of
ever-increasing complexity on every front, it is not likely
that military officer career complexity can be simplified
35

to any degree in the near future. It is also unlikely that
anyone would really want to make any sweeping changes to
the present military promotion processes. Competition for
available billets does serve as a natural selection process,
and is desirable in so far as officers deserving of advance-
ment are not lost through unavoidable assignment to a pro-
motionally undesirable billet (if such billets actually
exist) . Amendment of the job rotation policy to provide
for longer tour lengths in the senior military management
support activity billets would, however, have a number of
beneficial results. It would decrease the present number
of re-adjustments to new working environments and personnel.
It would give the officer more time to learn his new job
before making key decisions, while at the same time holding
him more accountable for the decisions he does make. It
would encourage attention to longer-range objectives rather
than to, primarily, short-range goals. It would decrease
the number of moves of himself and family and save on reloca-
tion costs. And, from the civilian aspect, it would decrease
the number of disruptive transition periods which precede
and follow each change of command. The present mood of
Congress, induced by the recent dramatic increase in
military pension costs, is to possibly reorient the mili-
tary to 30-year vice 20-year careers. If this change occurs,
then it would appear that the added years of service might
provide the opportunity to implement longer tour length
assignments. Whether or not this occurs, however, it would
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be in the interest of improving overall management in the
shore establishment to make a study of what optimum tour
lengths should be and how best to implement them.
With respect to the problem of preparation for management
duties, it would appear that, after an initial grounding in
the technical-scientific fields, more officers should be
encouraged to take advanced degrees in the business and
management field. To verify this, a study should be made
to determine what the optimum mix of hard science - manage-
ment formal education should be, and in what stages of the








I am writing this letter to request your assistance in
a research program regarding Aeronautical Engineering Duty
Officer career patterns. As a Professor of the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, I am conducting
this research study under the sponsorship of the Naval Aviation
Executive Institute of the Naval Air Systems Command.
I have enclosed a questionnaire entitled "AEDO Judgmental
Perceptions of Captain Billet Desirability as a Springboard to
Flag Rank." Your answers will provide invaluable data upon
which a fundamental and unique baseline will be established.
I will assure you that your personal identity and individual
responses will not be released in any way. Only unidentified
group information will be used in this study. The success or
failure of this research effort will naturally depend upon
your response.
The enclosed questionnaire probably will take about 15
minutes to answer. The document contains pertinent instruc-
tions for completion and return.
Thank you for your cooperation.

AEDO JUDGMENTAL PERCEPTIONS OF CAPTAIN




The August 1975 AEDO Directory lists seven Flag Officer
billets and 84 Captain Officer billets. Obviously, some of
the Captain billets may be superior to others as a "spring-
board" to Flag rank. Several degrees of billet "desirability"
for this purpose are given below, followed by a listing of
AEDO Captain billets as shown in the AEDO Directory. Please
enter the appropriate Number Code of billet desirability, as
you see it, in the box at the right of each listed Captain
billet. "["Consider only the promotion potential factor; dis-
regard all other factors such as geographic desirability,
etc.) Space is provided at the end of the questionnaire to
write in billets we may have missed, or that you would like
to see. Space is also provided for your name if you care to
include this information.
Please place an answer in every box provided, including
that indicating your rank, and return the questionnaire in
the enclosed reply envelope.
NUMBER CODE BILLET DESIRABILITY




5 SOMEWHAT BELOW AVERAGE
6




ACTIVITY BILLET DESIGNATOR ANSWER
FLEET STAFFS
COMNAVAIRLANT FORCE MAT OFFICER 1510
ACFT MAT $ ENG 1512




ACOS MAT READ 1510
FLEET READINESS ACTIVITIES










NARF ALAMEDA CO 1500
NARF JACKSONVILLE CO 1500
NARF NORFOLK CO 1500
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ACTIVITY BILLET DESIGNATOR ANSWER
REWORK/REPAIR ACTIVITIES (con't)
















































ACTIVITY BILLET DESIGNATOR ANSWER
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST § EVALUATION (con't)













DIR PROJ MGMT 1510
DIR SYS EVAL 1510




CHIEF OF STAFF 1500
DIR AIR VEHICLE DEPT 1512
HEADQUARTERS/DEPARTMENTAL
MIL AST-SYS ACQ MGT 1510
AED/AMD/AIRSYS 1500
T§E OFFICE 1510
SEN MEM BIS 1512
DIR OSHA 1510
TECH DIR 1510
RELIABIL. $ MAINTAIN. 1510
NAV P$P DIR 1510






ACTIVITY BILLET DESIGNATOR ANSWER













PM ANTI-RAD MSL (PMA-242)
PM S-3A (PMA-244)







AED/AMG MGMT (AIR- 9 80) 1500
DIR P$P DIV (AIR-302) 1510
DIR ADV SYS (AIR-03P) 1510
AV OVHL SCHD DIR (AIR-414) 1500
PROG COORD SUP A/C (APC-4) 1510
AST DPTY PROJ MGR F-14 (PMA-241-1) 1500
1510
1510
PM ANTI-SHIP WPN (PMA-258) 1510
1510
PM CRUS MSL (PMA-263) 1510
PM ASW A/C SENS (PMA-264) 1510
AST MAT ACQ (AIR-05A) 1510
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ACTIVITY BILLET DESIGNATOR ANSWER
HEADQUARTERS/DEPARTMENTAL (con ' t)
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ DIR ACQ RSC (AIR-501) 1510
DIR ENGINEERING DIV (AIR-520) 1510
DIR ACFT/WPN SYS DIV (AIR-510) 1510
DIR AIRFRAME DIV (AIR-530) 1510
DIR CREW SYS DIV (AIR-531) 1510
DIR ARMAMENT DIV (AIR-532) 1510
DIR AVIO DIV (AIR-533) 1510
GSE PROJ MGR (AIR-534) 1500
COMPTROLLER (AIR- 08)
DIR PROPUL DIV (AIR-536) 1510
SHIP INSTAL MGMT (AIR-537) 1510
1510







WRITE-IN (1) SOME WE MISSED













The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance
in a research program regarding Aeronautical Engineering Duty
Officer career patterns. As a Professor of the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, I am conducting this research study
under the sponsorship of the Naval Aviation Executive Institute
of the Naval Air Systems Command.
The enclosed form(s) correspond to the AEDO Captain billets
assigned your command, as listed in the August 1975 edition of
the AEDO Directory. Information is desired concerning the time
span of incumbency of the officer(s) who have held the billet(s)
since approximately 1960 (excepting officers who temporarily
served in an "acting" capacity) . The time spans are needed to
both month and year. Enclosed are form(s) on which to list the
requested information, and an addressed envelope for their
return.
Your answer will provide valuable data upon which a funda-
mental and unique baseline will be established. I will assure
you that your responses will not be released in any way. Only
unidentified group information will be used in this study. The
success or failure of this research effort will naturally depend
on your response.
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